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An Awkward Partner? 
Britain’s implementation of the Working Time Directive  
 
Abstract 
The dominance of member states in the field of social policy has been traditionally 
depicted as one of the main hurdles facing the development of a European social policy.  
Resistance by national government to the transfer of influence and control over soc ial 
policy to the European level has been particularly true for Britain.  Opposition to 
various initiatives, such as the Social Charter and Social Chapter has demonstrated this.  
It is in this context that this article examines Britain’s implementation of the Working 
Time Directive, this being demonstrative of the distinction between member states and 
the EU in the social policy arena.  In this sense, the Working Time Directive is 
significant not just because of the provisions it brings to British employees, but because 
it demonstrates the changing nature of the relationship between member states and the 
EU in the realm of social policy. 
I 
Introduction 
This article examines the introduction and implementation of the European Working 
Time Directive in Britain.  This piece of legislation stems from the November 1993 
agreement signed by the European Union (EU) Council of Ministers concerning the 
organisation of Working Time (Council, 1993).  As is the case for all EU Directives, i 
the fundamental aim of such legislation is the provision of a common set of standards 
throughout all member states.  But because Directives provide for member sta tes to 
individually decide how they will best achieve the aims of the Directive, there 
accordingly exists room for distinctions to emerge between nations.  Thus, although 
Directives have the overall aim of ensuring an equal application of a particular policy in 
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each member state, it is often the case that distinctions do materialise as regards the 
method and content of implementation.  Member states thus have a degree of power 
over the extent to which national policy mirrors the Directive.  In this context, while it 
might appear that the Working Time Directive would produce a common minimum 
standard of employment conditions throughout the EU, there is significant potential for 
variation between countries and between organisations within (and between) particular 
countries.  This state of affairs accordingly demonstrates the competing tensions 
between the desire of the European Commission to establish a common set of social 
policy standards and the ability for member states to maintain certain distinct national 
provisions. 
This article specifically examines the process of implementation through a 
comparative analysis of companies based in Britain. Case study material highlights the 
traditional distinct approach of Britain to industrial relations and labour market 
regulation compared to other European countries, reflective of a laissez-faire approach 
based on voluntarism and a limited role for statutory instruments.  The article provides 
a review of British industrial relations policy in the 1980s and 1990s, and demonstrates 
the extent to which Britain’s implementation of the Working Time Directive is 
representative of the wider shift away from national responsibility in the field of social 
policy to the EU level.  The research draws on comparative data obtained from survey 
material on company structure, policy co-ordination, hours of work, annual leave, work 
breaks, record keeping and monitoring. Semi-structured interviews were conducted 
with managers responsible for implementing the Regulations and with workers’ 
representatives. ii   Information gathered through this medium focused on issues 
highlighted in the survey material, including policy networks, rest breaks and 
definitions of Working Time. 
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II 
The British Tradition 
Recent hostility by Britain towards the development of a social dimension within the 
EU can be traced to the unwillingness of the Conservative governments of Margaret 
Thatcher (1979-1990) and John Major (1990-1997) to accept labour market regulation 
from Brussels.  While they accepted ‘...the need for proper standards of social provision 
to underpin the single market’, they were ‘...not prepared to see Community 
competence spread into industrial relations’ (Hurd, 1991: c.1017). This was principally 
because in the aftermath of Thatcher’s election as Prime Minister in 1979 the British 
labour market underwent a process of rapid transformation.  She brought a fresh 
approach to industrial relations (Crouch, 1991: 326-55); the advocation of free 
competition manifesting itself into a reduction in the power of trade unions through the 
deregulation of industrial practices (Moon, 1994: 43-9; Marsh and Rhodes, 1995: 
49-54). 
A tough negotiating policy on the domestic front was equally apparent at the 
European level, where Britain used its veto in the Council of Ministers to object to the 
imposition of binding legislation.  A consequence of this strategy was a reduction in the 
speed that European social legislation progressed in the early 1980s and demonstrated 
the power of member states to block EU progress in this policy arena.  At the domestic 
level the Thatcher government embarked on a series of employment reforms as part of 
an effort to increase the competitiveness of the British economy.  This included the 
replacement of out-of-date industrial practices that she perceived responsible for the 
economic malaise that engulfed the nation in the 1970s, and reflected a dual desire to 
curb the powers of trade unions and reassert the position of the employer vis-à-vis the 
employee (Marsh, 1992).  For example, between 1983 and 1993 the number of British 
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people working as part-time employees in their main job increased by 31%, contrasting 
with a drop of 2.2% in the number of full-time employees (Employment Gazette, 1995: 
215; Marullo, 1995: 30). iii   By 1987 British part-time workers were supposedly 
suffering the worst pay and employment rights in the EC (Low Pay Unit, 1987; The 
Economist, 1998a). 
Changes to the British labour market meant it had the least legislative restrictions 
within the European Union on what hours could be worked in tandem with when they 
could be worked throughout the year.  To this end, within Britain there were no 
nationally applied statutory rights to annual paid holidays, no laws governing hours of 
work, shift working (apart from drivers of certain goods and passenger vehicles), 
breaks, and no right to be represented by a trade union with regard to Working Time 
issues (Rojot, 1994: 6).  The reality of this situation was that British legislation did not 
offer the same level of protection to employees as was evident in many other EU states.  
There therefore existed considerable variations between EU member states as to the 
regulation of working time and employment practices, of which the British government 
regarded the lack of stringent laws to be an important factor in creating a flexible labour 
market. 
The overall trend therefore reflected movement towards a labour market with 
limited regulations, evidenced by British employees having the longest working week 
in the European Union (Incomes Data Service, Issue 414, June 1996 and Issue 710, 
April 1996).  But more significantly, these developments demonstrated the dominance 
of member states over social policy.  This was in itself considerably influenced by the 
fact that this was a policy area that government’s could exercise considerable authority 
over in contrast to the majority of domestic policy-making being subject to external 
pressure, such as environment policy.  An ability to exert influence over social policy at 
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the domestic level went in tandem with the reality that policy-making in this field was 
linked to electoral success.  Moreover, the ability of government to determine the shape 
of social policy in the 1980s was further influenced by the relative weakness of the 
social democratic actors in the political arena.  In the case of Britain this was illustrated 
by the declining fortunes of the Labour Party and a fall in trade union membership and 
influence, while at the same time there was a relative increase in the power and 
influence of employers vis-à-vis the employee.  To this end, not only was government 
more receptive to business interests, there was no counterweight to this viewpoint. 
The end product of this situation was the emergence of considerable differences 
in the social policy provisions of European nations, partly because government’s 
themselves acted as considerable obstacles to any Community wide initiatives.  To this 
end, successive attempts to establish a European social policy had been of a limited 
success. Such developments influenced the new President of the European 
Commission, Jacques Delors, to propose a European Social Space in 1986, later 
announcing at the June 1988 Hanover European Council that the Single Market should 
give the same priority to economic and social objectives (Doogan, 1992).  Although 
most member states shared this objective, Britain was predictably opposed, emphasised 
by the lack of support given to the Commission’s May 1989 preliminary draft of the 
Social Charter.  Britain was later isolated at the December 1989 Strasbourg European 
Council in not accepting the Social Charter, thereby demonstrating the differences 
among member states within this policy area.  Indeed, P rime Minister Thatcher 
‘considered it quite inappropriate for rules and regulation about working practices or 
welfare benefits to be set at the Community level’ (Thatcher, 1993: 750). 
A hostile stance was subsequently embodied in the then Conservative 
government objecting to the European Commission’s September 1990 proposal for a 
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Draft Directive concerning certain aspects of the Organisation of Working Time 
(COM(90)317, 8073/90).  The British government regarded hours of work as a 
domestic matter for negotiation between employers and employees, and not Brussels 
(Department for Employment, 1990: 11), though employers were increasingly the more 
dominant force in this relationship.  An anti-activist stance consequently mirrored the 
traditional British position within industrial relations reform.  From the very beginning 
the government’s objection was based on both political and economic principles.  In the 
first instance, the government believed that the Commission’s proposals challenged the 
established position to regulate hours of work at the national level and thus threatened 
the ability of the state to shape policy.  Secondly, the government thought the Directive 
would reduce the competitiveness and flexibility of the economy; a stance cultured by 
Britain having received the greatest percentage of all inward investment into the EU in 
recent years (European Community Direct Investment 1984-1989: 163).  Such a 
viewpoint was reiterated at the December 1991 Maastricht European Council when 
John Major negotiated an opt-out from the Social Chapter, having insisted that the 
chapter be removed from the main body of the Treaty text (Blair, 1999a: 93-120).  The 
effect of this negotiating outcome, combined with the Maastricht Treaty’s emphasis on 
subsidiarity and the fact that social protection legislation was subject to unanimous 
voting, meant that social policy initiatives from the Commission could be easily 
blocked.  As Linda Hantrais notes, ‘the competence of the Union to take policy 
decisions had been called into question, and member states had demonstrated that they 
were not prepared to forego national sovereignty in the interests of greater European 
social solidarity’ (Hantrais, 2000: 219). 
The British government’s opposition to the Working Time Directive was 
subsequently highlighted within the House of Commons and at meetings of the EU 
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Social Affairs Council (Shephard, 1992).  A combative stance did, nevertheless, 
produce some concessions, namely: the right for employees to work more than 48 hours 
per week and the right for employers and employees to make collective agreements on 
working time at a local level. iv   But such developments failed to satisfy the 
Conservative government of the day, prompting it to challenge the Directive’s legal 
basis in the European Court of Justice after the Council reached a political agreement 
on a common position in June 1993 (Forsyth, 1993).  That challenge proved 
unsuccessful, having been based on an assumption that the Directive was wrongly 
implemented via the health and safety provisions of the SEA (Article 118A) which 
permitted decisions to be taken by majority voting, and thereby overruling British 
opposition.v  This was specifically because the government considered that those areas 
of social policy not embraced by the Maastricht opt-out should be subject to unanimous 
voting.  But this was a view not shared by the Court of Justice, with the 
Advocate-General’s March 1996 opinion against the UK and its subsequent 
confirmation in November by the European Court of Justice consequently angering the 
British government (Advocate General, 1996; European Court of Justice, 1996).  In its 
judgement the Court specifically noted that the concepts of ‘working environment’, 
‘safety’ and ‘health’ within the provision comprise ‘all factors, physical or otherwise, 
capable of affecting the health and safety of the worker in his working environment’ 
(European Court of Justice, 1996: para 15). 
The significance of the Court’s decision was that it demonstrated a movement to 
establish social policy at the European level that could not be hindered by member state 
obstruction.  In so doing it went some way to readdress the balance in favour of member 
states as confirmed by the Maastricht Treaty, with the Court’s decisions having become 
an important means of establishing a more harmonious system of social policy 
 9 
(Leibfried and Pierson, 2000: 276).  The European Court of Justice has thus offered a 
fresh path to renewed activism in the area of social policy.  This is against a backdrop of 
member state obstruction to European Commission initiatives and a lack of consensus 
within the Council of Ministers as to the best way forward in the area of social policy.  
Of the reasons for this, one of the most important is that the European Court of Justice 
does not suffer from the same political horse-trading that is a common feature in 
European Union negotiations, while the voting procedure of the Court only requires a 
simple majority vote. 
A consequence of the European Court’s decision on Working Time was that the 
Conservative government had to immediately start the process of implementing the 
Directive at the national level.  But it similarly championed the reversal of the Court’s 
decision at the European level whereby Ministers advocated the importance of national 
control of working hours at EU meetings.  This was marked by the Department of Trade 
and Industry publishing in December 1996 a Consultation Document on Measures to 
Implement Provisions of the EC Directive on the Organisation of Working Time (DTI, 
1996).  The government also announced that a key negotiating policy within the 
1996-97 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) would be a tightening of Article 118A to 
remove the Directive’s applicability (Lang, 1996).  This threat was, of course, 
influenced by a real desire to retain national control over social policy legislation. 
At this time it is worth remembering that the wider political climate was 
dominated by the imminent general election, which brought victory for New Labour in 
May 1997. Committed to the Directive’s implementation in opposition, it was 
nevertheless just short of a year before draft- implementing measures were issued by the 
Labour government on 8 April 1998, with the provision that individuals could work 
longer hours if they wished (DTI, 1998a).  At the end of July 1998 the government put 
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the final version before Parliament, with there having been very little discussion within 
the Palaces of Westminster on this subject.vi  This document, which included a small 
number of changes to the original consultation text, paved the way for the Directive to 
enter force within Britain from 1 October 1998.vii  This was one month short of two 
years after the Directive became force within the EU and despite the government 
having been open to legal action because of the failure to implement the Directive by 
November 1996, only a few cases emerged.  It can therefore be seen that while the 
Thatcher government considered the setting of social policy regulations to be a 
domestic matter outwith the scope and competence of the then European Community, 
the reality of this state of affairs was no longer true.  In this sense, the Working Time 
Directive highlighted that member states are no longer able to fully control the social 
policy arena, though they are nevertheless able to exercise considerable influence in 
this policy field.  
 
III 
The Politics of Implementation 
Labour’s election to office immediately created a more constructive relationship 
between Britain and the EU, demonstrated by acceptance of the Social Chapter at the 
June 1997 Amsterdam European Council meeting.  Despite signalling the coming of a 
reformist government in the area of industrial relations, this decision was nevertheless 
based on the Treaty of Amsterdam’s new Employment Chapter reflecting a flexible 
method of governance in the social policy arena (Hughes and Smith, 1998: 96-7).  This 
move was symptomatic of the government’s desire not to impose strict regulations on 
labour market practices: the new Employment Chapter represented a flexible strategy 
more akin to British than French (regulatory) views.  Such a strategy was linked to 
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Labour’s election to office, which was based upon a centrist and anti- interventionist 
policy aimed at middle-class voters.  This has been reflected in the absence of close 
links between trade unions and the government, being instead replaced by a ‘fairness 
not favours’ style of policy-making whereby trade unions and employer organisations 
equally discuss matters with government. 
The politics of this duel are evident over the Working Time Directive, which the 
Labour Party committed itself to implementing upon election to office.  The outcome of 
this is that British employees are now governed by a set of conditio ns that include a 
maximum working week of 48-hours; a requirement for breaks throughout the day, at 
the end of the day and every week or fortnight; a provision for paid annual holidays; the 
regulation of night shift working; and the creation of a specific set of conditions for 
young workers (see box 1).   But while the government publicly championed the 
Directive as a distinction between it and the Conservative Party, it was also notable that 
the Labour government asked for and obtained derogations in many of the policy areas 
covered by the Directive.  Such a strategy was considered a means of pacifying the 
interest of business and pressure groups such as the Institute of Directors and 
Confederation of British Industry. 
Such use of derogations both mirrors and stands opposite to the practice of the 
previous Conservative government.  Thus, the ability for workers to qualify for three 
weeks’ paid annual leave after 13 weeks’ work is markedly different from the 
Conservative government’s plan for workers to qualify for the three-week holiday after 
49 weeks’ service (Regulations 13-16).viii  Furthermore, while the Labour government 
proposed that the rest break permitted after six-hours work should be at least 20 minutes 
(and should count as part of working time), the Conservative government had 
advocated that the rest break need be no longer than five minutes.  In addition, although 
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the Conservative government proposed that only employment tribunals would enforce 
the Directive, Labour decided to involve the health and safety enforcing authorities and 
local authorities.  To this end, while newspaper headlines have focused upon the 
maximum working week of 48-hours and the provision for eight-hour night shifts, the 
regulations are of a wider ranging nature and have knock-on effects for many full-time 
and agency workers.  Thus, the legislation empowers employees with new powers, 
including health assessments for night workers and the provision of contemporary rest 
breaks for those who do not qualify for a break.  The latter includes security guards, an 
industry where some of the worst employment practices exist. 
Box 1: 
Key provisions of the Working Time Regulations 
 
 Maximum weekly working time of 48 hours (including overtime) averaged over 17 
weeks. 
 A minimum of 11 consecutive hours rest period per 24-hour period. 
 A minimum weekly uninterrupted rest period of 24 hours, plus a daily rest period of 
11 hours - amounting to 35 hours in total. 
 A rest break for workers whose working day is longer than six hours (details to be 
worked out by collective agreement). 
 A normal maximum working time of 8 hours in any 24 for night workers and an 
actual maximum working time of 8 hours in any 24 for night workers whose work 
involves special hazards or heavy physical or mental strain. 
 A minimum period of leave of 3 weeks per year, rising to 4 by 23 November 1999. 
 
Of the exemptions, the Labour government provided the ability for employees to 
work more than 48 hours a week if they so wished, ix while the Regulations initially 
limited holiday provision to three weeks paid leave (rather than the four weeks 
provided for in the Directive). This increased to four weeks in November 1999.  The 
provision for paid holiday leave is nevertheless weakened by the ability for public 
holidays to be included in the three (four)-week holiday entitlement.  It can therefore be 
seen that the scope and coverage of the Regulations are somewhat limited by the ability 
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for employees to continue to work long hours, while the holiday entitlement is less 
significant because of the ability to count public holidays. 
The significance of these exemptions is that while the Regulations provide added 
employment protection to the employee, the government has left considerable room for 
manoeuvre as to the extent of the applicability of these conditions. Chief among these 
was the ability for employees to work more than 48 hours a week if they so wished, 
with this option being aimed at white-collar middle-managers in the service sector who 
have a tendency to work long hours.  This in itself was not that a surprising 
development as the Trades Union Congress and the CBI were aware that it would be 
difficult for all employees to suddenly shift working patterns to less than 48 hours.  But 
what was surprising was that the government did not attempt to establish a negotiated 
reduction in working hours, bearing in mind that the ability to work in excess of 48 
hours per week is an option to be reviewed by the European Commission in 2003. 
In this sense, the fact that some British employees work in excess of 48-hours per 
week is not the primary distinction between Britain and other EU nations.  Indeed, 
despite the presence of the Directive throughout the EU, long-hours are features of 
many white-collar jobs in all member states.  For instance, while survey material 
established that the Dutch banking industry negotiated a maximum working week of 
36-hours in 1995, many of the managers interviewed commented that they too had 
hours of work that were in excess of 48 per week (EIRR, 2000). x The reason why this is 
so is that such employees tend to work the hours that the job requires because of future 
ambitions of promotion and concerns of job insecurity.  Where a distinction can be 
made, however, is that there is an absence of social partner involvement in the reduction 
of working hours in Britain.  What is evident from this research is that although there 
was some initial confusion over working hours, the maximum working week has posed 
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few problems.  This is because a great many working patterns are within the 48-hour 
weekly limit, while those employees who do work in excess of this limit often have the 
ability to be exempt from the Regulations.  For instance, all the companies interviewed 
for this research had contracted working hours ranging from 35 to 40 hours per week, 
although managers privately recognised that they tended to work longer hours. 
 In analysing the Labour government’s strategy of implementation, it is evident 
that there was both a desire to maintain a flexible labour market and an unwillingness to 
set comprehensive Regulations.  The implication of this strategy was that specific 
decisions on Working Time could be taken at local level, though the provision for a 
flexible interpretation produced confusion among employers and employees as to the 
scope and coverage of the Regulations.  The direct result of this was that organisations 
such as the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS) received a dramatic 
increase in the number of telephone enquiries, of which a significant proportion 
concerned working time (see appendix 1).  Moreover, of those calls relating to working 
time received by the ACAS East Midlands office, the biggest area of concern related to 
annual leave and maximum weekly working time (see table 1).  This was equally 
apparent from the companies surveyed for this research.  Such statistics are therefore 
demonstrative of the confusion created by the absence of defined guidelines. 
Table 1: 
Working Time Regulations record of calls received by 




















174 78 50 49 61 607 226 1245 
Nov. 
1998 
104 48 35 24 27 552 149 939 
Dec. 
1998 
46 40 21 12 13 442 132 706 





66 48 25 15 23 698 123 998 
Mar. 
1999 
78 62 35 22 15 973 163 1348 
Apr. 
1999 
64 63 28 12 15 918 140 1242 
May. 
1999 





The British experience of implementing the Working Time Directive is reflective of the 
traditional unwillingness of successive governments to fully accept the intrusion of 
European policy on domestic affairs.  The Conservative governments of the 1980s and 
1990s certainly marked a high point of this awkwardness when dealing with European 
issues.  During those years, Britain encountered a dramatic change in industrial 
relations policy, whereby labour markets were deregulated and employment became 
measured by its degree of flexibility.  Much of these reforms assisted in Britain 
attracting the greatest amount of inward investment of all EU nations, though many 
other EU governments considered that an absence of labour market regulation in 
Britain represented an unfair competitive advantage.  One effect of these changes to the 
British labour market was an increase in unemployment rates, with many of the new 
part-time ‘flexible’ service sector jobs not replacing the traditional full-time 
manufacturing occupations.  For those individuals who remained in emp loyment, job 
security became increasingly fragile, which in the presence of few restrictions on 
employment conditions resulted in longer working weeks, especially among 
white-collar middle management positions. The election of the Labour government in 
May 1997 was expected by the electorate to result in some form of change to industrial 
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relations policy within Britain.  To be sure, the Working Time Regulations sit alongside 
the establishment of a Minimum Wage as evidence of this.  Significantly, however, 
both policies pay as much attention to business interests as employee protection.  
This situation demonstrates the constraints imposed on government at the 
national level from different interest groups, such as trade unions and employer 
representatives.  But while it might appear that governments are able to shape policy 
objectives that are reflective of these interests, it is in fact the case that the capacity for 
domestic decision-making is greatly determined by the further progression of EU 
integration.  To this end, the ability of member states to exercise independent financial 
authority (tax and spend) is constrained by developments at the EU level.  For instance, 
member state progression to monetary union has taken place within the context of the 
need to meet the four economic convergence criteria, which for some member states, 
such as Italy, has limited the amount of money the government could spend on social 
protection measures.  It is therefore evident that changes within the EU, such as 
monetary union, do limit the ability of member states to exercise independent 
sovereignty. 
But whereas this scenario demonstrates the closer linkages and the diminishing 
levels of state sovereignty within the EU, it is also evident that resistance by member 
states to Europe-wide developments is bound by the EU’s institutional structure, 
particularly the dominance of the European Court of Justice.  In this context, Britain’s 
implementation of the Working Time Directive is demonstrative of the constraints 
imposed on government by the Court.  And although the British government chose to 
make some slight adjustments to the terms of the Directive, it did so from a tightly 
controlled list.  So the options for government’s to be awkward when implementing 
such legislation has diminished, being shaped by the diminishing level of national 
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sovereignty within the EU.  And this scenario of integration being driven more by the 
decisions of the Court rather than the efforts of the Commission is likely to be the main 





Calls answered by ACAS East Midlands office 
Month Total Calls Answered Number of calls relating 
to Working Time 
April 1998 3366  
May 1998 3018  
June 1998 3462  
July 1998 3463  
August 1998 3068  
September 1998 4082  
October 1998 4807 1245 
November 1998 4400 939 
December 1998 3520 706 
January 1999 4994 925 
February 1999 5515 998 
March 1999 6727 1348 
April 1999 5928 1242 
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 Directives are one of the four main acts which are adopted by the Council and the European 
Commission, the others being regulations, decisions and recommendations.  Directives are a legal 
instrument requiring  member states to adopt appropriate ru les, although they are left  with the choice as to 
how to achieve the objectives. 
ii
 Interviews were conducted between March and June 1999 with companies that represented different 
sectors of the labour force that had a trad ition of a long hour culture and shift working: Abbey National 
Bank;  British Nursing Association; Group 4 Security; Ikea;  J. Sainsbury; Marks and Spencer, Novotel; 
Powergen; Raleigh Cycles; and Van den Bergh Foods.  Interviews were also conducted with the 
Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitrat ion Service (acas); Confederation of British Industry (CBI); and  the 
Trades Union Congress (TUC).  Interviews with the latter two provided informat ion on the degree to 
which they were consulted by government as to the content of the Regulations, and the feedback obtained 
from their members as to the experience of imple menting the Regulations.  Material obtained from 
ACAS demonstrated the degree to which  employers and employees sought clarification as to the scope 
and coverage of the Regulations. 
iii
 There has generally been a strong fiscal incentive to employ part -time and self-employed workers in 
Britain because emp loyers have not had to pay national insurance contributions on part -time earn ings 
until they reach a given threshold, whilst not having to pay national insurance contributions at all for the 
self-employed.  The introduction of the equal treatment d irect ive has, however, meant that such 
distinctions are no longer applicable. 
iv
 The limitations of the Directive apply  to ‘working t ime’.  This is defined as ‘any period which the 
worker is working, at the employer’s disposal and carrying  out his practices, or duties, in accordance with 
national laws and/or practice’ (Article 2, para 1). 
v
 The government had taken the view that there was not ‘real’ ev idence to link working time with health 
and safety, and that as the working time conditions were essentially dealing with working conditions then 
they should have been dealt with through unanimity voting. 
vi
 See, for example, Early Day Motions 1601 1997/98 in the name of David Chidgey and 1637 1997/98 in 
the name of Christopher Gill. 
vii
 The Regulations, which implement the Working Time Direct ive and the EC Young Workers Directive, 
have been made under section 2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972 .   See Council Directive 
94/33/EC of 22 June 1994 on the p rotection of young people at work.  For an overv iew of the Regulations 
see: 'The Working Time Regulations 1998', Incomes Data Service Brief No.620, September 1998, 
pp.10-17. 
viii
 While the leave can be taken in instalments, it has to be taken in the leave year in question and cannot 
be replaced by pay in lieu, apart from if the worker leaves the job early with leave owing.  If a worker 
leaves their job having actually taken more leave than their pro  rata entitlement, then a relevant 
agreement can stipulate that they should provide some sort of compensation to their employer.  There are 
no exceptions to this  provision. 
ix
 Regulat ion 4 provides a basic limit o f 48-hours to the working week to be averaged over 17 weeks, 
although the working week can be additionally averaged over 26 weeks in a special case. The provisions 
for a 48-hour working week to be averaged over a 17 week reference period can also be extended to up to 
52 weeks by collective agreement or by workforce agreement 
x
 Interview: Secretary General Dutch Employers Banking Federation, 23 June 1999.  
